The Syria Ship Is Sailing; U.S. Policy Standing at the Dock

U.S. policy on Syria took another hit this week. The Arab League, which suspended Syria 12 years ago for the regime’s atrocities during the first year of the Arab Spring and ensuing civil war, has allowed Syria back into the fold.

While far from a unanimous decision among the 22 members of the league, 13 nations agreed to the step that allows Syria to participate in the upcoming annual Arab League Summit for the first time since the 2010 summit in Libya when Qaddafi was still in power—a reminder that you have to cross some serious lines to be blacklisted from the league.

The 2011 summit, which was delayed by the Arab Spring, was finally held in Baghdad in 2012 and was notable for a couple of reasons. It was the first summit in Iraq since 1990 and was designed as a “coming out” party for post-war Iraq—and required the Iraqi government to pretty much declare martial law in Baghdad to ensure security. I was the NPR producer at the summit and recall vividly how in addition to celebrating Iraq’s “progress,” the Arab League emphasized Syria’s suspension by setting an empty desk and chair.

The hard line has gradually softened, however. The Syrian regime, with the help of Russia and Iran, has largely quashed the Syrian opposition and reduced it to a small swath of territory along the country’s northwest border with Turkey, which had supported the Syrian opposition, but even that is beginning to soften. That area is also close to the epicenter of the February earthquake in Turkey.

In fact, the earthquake is credited with accelerating the normalization of relations with Syrian President/Dictator Bashar al-Assad, as noted by journalist Taim Alhajj in a commentary for the Carnegie Endowment’s Sada site last month, prior to the Arab League’s decision.

It is becoming abundantly clear that the earthquake, which ravaged the south of Turkey and the northwestern parts of Syria, and devastated the lives of millions, is positively serving the Syrian regime in its attempt to evade international pressure. As a result of the immense damage, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who are key players in regional dynamics, have begun to ignore the decade-long sanctions that were imposed on Syria. Other countries are following suit. In February 2023, Bashar al-Assad made an official visit to the Sultanate of Oman for the first time in a decade. The actions of these Arab governments show their willingness to patch relations with the regime and help find a solution to Syria’s almost 12-year civil war.

The Associated Press report on the Arab League’s decision states:

Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit said in a televised statement that the decision to return Syria to the organization, which will allow Assad to take part in the group’s upcoming May 19 summit, is part of a gradual process of resolving the conflict.

“This doesn’t mean that the Syria crisis has been resolved, on the contrary,” he said. “But it allows the Arab (states) for the first time in years to communicate with the Syrian government to discuss all the problems.”

The problem for the United States is that this movement, this effort to regionalize the effort to resolve the Syrian civil war, all but kills what was always an aspirational element of U.S. Syria policy.

According to the most recent Lead Inspector General report on the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria (disclaimer, I was the managing editor of that report from summer 2018 until spring 2021):

In Syria, the U.S. Government seeks conditions in which an ISIS resurgence is prevented and northeastern Syria is stable and secure. Core U.S. Government policy priorities in Syria include supporting the enduring defeat of ISIS, supporting ceasefires across the country, the expansion of humanitarian access, accountability for the Syrian regime’s atrocities and respect for international law and human rights, and a political process led by Syrians under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254.

The accountability objective and the political process are less likely to happen than finding a working escalator on the D.C. metro.

UN Security Council Resolution 2254 calls for a political settlement that leads to power sharing and a democratic election in Syria. The Syrian regime has long made a mockery of the process by participating just enough to keep it going, and the United Nations—and U.S. government—have continued to invest hope in the process.

But as any Syria analyst will tell you, the Assad regime isn’t about to enter a power sharing deal or make any concessions. It’s the same case with most dictators. The regime has so much blood on its hands that the only way it will end is with Bashar al-Assad on a gurney—either by natural causes or otherwise.

Bashar al-Assad watched in 2011 as Arab dictators fell. He made clear then, as his father had when he ruled Syria, that he would go scorched earth to remain in power.

Twelve years later, he has not only survived a civil war and international sanctions, but he is also on the rebound and welcoming support from wealthy neighbors. The United States needs to recalibrate its policy to deal with that reality.

To be clear, I am no fan or advocate for Bashar al-Assad and never have been. He’s one of the most ruthless and craven dictators in recent memory and almost makes Vladimir Putin look like Ned Flanders. Al-Assad is a war criminal and human rights violator and should be charged and tried accordingly.

But he won’t be, not anytime soon at least. He was more shrewd and savage than Saddam, Hosni, Muammar, or any of the others who fell or were driven out. He ensured there was no possible successor regime in waiting. He eviscerated the opposition and played the Iraq card to the international community—meaning that he sowed fear that a post-regime change Syria would make Iraq look like the cakewalk the Bush administration claimed it would be.

In January 2012, foreign policy expert Steven Cook wrote a piece in the Atlantic arguing that it might be time for military intervention in Syria.

The wild card in the bomb-Syria-for-humanitarian-reasons argument is what post-Assad Syria might actually look like. Syria has similar ethnic and sectarian complexities as Lebanon and Iraq and there is reason to believe that, in the vicissitudes of politics, these groups might seek to settle scores against one another and to gain advantage through violence. Then again, it is worth asking whether analysts are over-correcting as a result of the American experience in Iraq. Given recent history there, it certainly seems that caution is warranted, but that means leaving Syrians to their fate with a regime which seems intent on shooting and torturing its way out of its present troubles.

I believe that dynamic is central to what kept the international community at the water’s edge. Of course, it was aided by the fact that the Syrian opposition was unable to coalesce and form a government in exile ready to step in once the Assad regime was toppled. That said, the Libyan National Transitional Council that came together in 2011 to be the uniter of post-Qaddafi Libya seduced the international community and media (speaking from experience) with their technocrats and calls for democracy and human rights and then utterly failed to win the peace and build a stable, secure Libya.

Hence, it’s understandable that the international community was wary about ousting al-Assad, and once Russia came to his rescue, that pretty much ended any chance of regime change.

So, where does this leave things? In addition to the lofty goals of accountability and political transition in Syria, the United States still has other policy objectives that are served by Operation Inherent Resolve, the counter-ISIS mission.

First, obviously, is ensuring ISIS is unable to reconstitute and present a threat to the United States, its allies, and interests. Second, is presenting at least some check on Iranian activity in the region. The limited U.S. troop presence in Syria provides intel on and somewhat of a hindrance to Iranian activity, particularly its use of Syria as a land bridge to support Hezbollah in Lebanon and threaten Israel.

However, as I have written several times before, that U.S. presence is tenuous. The Syrian Democratic Forces, a nonstate entity comprising mostly Syrian Kurds, continues to control a portion of eastern Syria. As long as they do, the United States will likely maintain a presence. But it’s getting more difficult as Russia and Iran are stepping up hostile actions against U.S. and Kurdish forces. Plus, Turkey has been carrying out actions against the Kurds and threatening a wider campaign.

Here are some excerpts from the latest Lead Inspector General report:

During the quarter, Iranian and Russian forces—both partners of the Syrian regime—conducted provocative activities against Coalition and U.S. forces, including deadly Iranian airstrikes on U.S. bases. In the north, hostilities between Türkiye and the SDF continued to flare.

General Kurilla, the USCENTCOM Commander, said that in March, Russian forces conducted the highest number of tactical air flights (fighter aircraft or air-to-ground aircraft) over U.S. forces in Syria since the beginning of the Syrian conflict. As of March 22, Russian jets had conducted 25 tactical flights over At Tanf, compared to none in February and 14 in January.

During the quarter, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and said he would welcome more Russian military bases or troops in Syria and would like the Russian presence to become permanent.

Thus, there are serious questions about how long it will be before Syria, backed by Russia, Iran, and perhaps members of the Arab League, closes in on the SDF and creates a situation where it’s no longer tenable for U.S. forces to remain in Syria to counter ISIS. However, according to the Lead IG report, the United States isn’t changing course, at least publicly.

State said the United States continued to support UNSCR 2254 and efforts to advance a political resolution to the crisis, including through the convening of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva.

According to State, the U.S. Government “will not normalize relations with the Assad regime” nor lift sanctions until there is real, enduring progress toward a political solution, and urged “anyone engaging with Damascus to consider—sincerely and thoroughly—how their engagement” could help Syrians in need.

That is likely not the calculus of the nations that have normalized relations with Syria or others in the region that are considering doing so. They see that there is no near-term alternative to Bashar al-Assad, and they have economic or other geopolitical gains they see they can make by welcoming Syria back to the fold.

Members of the Arab League are changing the conditions on the ground for Syria, and the Biden administration is going to need to assess what policy options it has other than throwing moral support behind a flagging UN process.